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Individual and Country-level Institutional
Trust and Public Attitude to Welfare
Expenditures in 24 Transitional Countries
Nazim Habibov
Does institutional trust on the individual and on the countrylevel influence public attitudes to state social welfare expenditures in transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
the Caucasus and Central Asia? To answer this question, this
study draws on a comparative survey conducted in 24 countries. Multilevel binomial logit regression was used to allow for
the simultaneous inclusion of variables at the individual- and
country-levels of analysis. Institutional trust is associated with
positive attitudes to welfare expenditures on the individual level,
but not on the country level. Women, older individuals, those
who are less educated, and those of low-income are associated
with more positive attitudes to social welfare investments. Ideology is another important factor influencing public attitudes to
welfare expenditures. By contrast, no significant effect of countrylevel poverty, inequality, and gross domestic product was found.
Key words: public redistribution, social capital, poverty, inequality, public opinion

There has been a recent surge in interest the study of the
beneficial effects of institutional trust on attitudes towards
welfare state expenditures. This promising line of inquiry is
guided by institutional theory (Edlund, 2006; March & Olsen,
1984; Rothstein & Steinmo, 2002). According to institutional
theory, trust in institutions reflects the degree of trust in the
political system (Baron-Epel, Weinstein, Haviv-Mesika, GartySandalon, & Green, 2008). Institutional trust represents the
level of confidence in members of the society that the system
of institutions which exists in the society is able to deliver favorable outcomes, even in the absence of continuous scrutiny
by individuals (Miller & Listhaug, 1990).
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, December 2014, Volume XLI, Number 4
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Sociologically, the concept of trust in institutions is closely
related to Putnam’s notion of ‘cooperation norms’ which serve
as a specific form of trust, and are related to the general functions of society (Voicu & Voicu, 2011). This concept stresses attitude of the individual to formal institutions within the society
and highlights the quality of interaction between individuals
and institutions (Rainer & Siedler, 2009). The concept of trust
in institutions is also associated with Coleman’s (1988) understanding of social capital as an interplay of norms of behaviors
of individuals in the society and their obligation to each other
and to the society at large.
As such, institutional trust indicates a vertical dimension
of social capital in society and it creates connections to its
formal institutions (Lindström & Mohseni, 2009). It also represents a dimension of bridging social capital, which reflects perceived levels of social justice, solidarity, and mutual support
in society.
The positive effect of trust is well described in the literature.
Thus, individuals in countries with higher levels of trust interact more effectively with their society’s formal institutions,
have more power and control over their lives, and consequently have a better welfare status (Blakely, Kennedy, & Kawachi,
2001; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Similarly, higher levels of
trust are associated with greater levels of political participation and enhanced opportunities for creating more generous
policy and administration for individuals and communities in
need (Lindström & Mohseni, 2009). Consequently, Levi (1997)
concluded that “the more trustworthy citizens perceive government to be, the more likely they are to contingently consent
to its policies” (p. 21).
In addition to theoretical contributions, there is now empirical evidence suggesting that institutional trust could be
a significant determinant of public attitudes toward welfare
expenditures. Trust in institutions played a critical role in the
development of the welfare state in Germany and Sweden
(Edlund, 2006; Gabriel & Trüdinger, 2011), and was also instrumental in defining attitudes towards welfare expenditures in
the U.S. (Rudolph, 2009). Trust is also an important factor in
explaining differences in public attitudes to welfare spending
between Europe and the U.S. (Edlund, 1999). Finally, drawing
on the data from 18 OECD countries, Rothstein, Samanni, &
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Teorell (2009) found that trustworthy institutions are a vital
prerequisite for peoples’ willingness to support expenditure
for social welfare.
Important as they are, the above-mentioned studies have
three main limitations. First, most of the previously-mentioned
studies were conducted at the individual level. Hence, only individual-level indicators of institutional trust were considered,
and no attempt was made to include contextual indicators.
This approach assumes that the beneficial properties of institutional trust are associated with individuals and their social
relationships, instead of being a collective attribute of communities or societies. However, the traditional concept of social
capital is a societal construct rather than a specific characteristic of an individual. Social capital, including institutional trust,
is a feature of the social organization of a society whereby civic
participation, reciprocity, or trust in others assists in facilitating individual cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1993,
2000). Hence, social capital would function as a resource for a
group of individuals if they work together towards a collective goal which could not be achieved by each individual separately (Macinko & Starfield, 2001). As a resource for a group
of people, social capital could belong both to the smaller and
most basic level of a group, for instance, the family, and, at
the same time, to the larger and broader group, such as the
country (Fukuyama, 1995). The studies of individual levels of
institutional trust do not explicitly take account of the possibility of institutional trust being a collective attribute of society,
and thus may obscure its possible contextual effect.
To overcome the above-discussed limitation, this study
explores institutional trust on both the individual and the
country aggregated (contextual) levels at the same time. It
makes the assumption that institutional trust at the individual
and country-level may not necessary be in conflict. Rather, institutional trust at the individual and contextual levels could simultaneously contribute to defining attitudes towards welfare
state expenditures. Since the effect of institutional trust at the
contextual level may be confounded with its effect at the individual level, this study employs multilevel regression modeling, which allows for the simultaneous examination of the two
levels of effects.
Secondly, most of the previously-conducted studies have
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analyzed the effects of institutional trust without explicitly taking into account well-documented alternative factors
which may influence attitudes towards welfare expenditures.
Among these alternative factors is the so-called self-interest
hypothesis (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Svallfors, 1997). According
to this hypothesis, the group of individuals who has been, or
who is expected to be, the recipient of welfare programs tends
to hold a more positive attitude to social welfare expenditures
than are groups of individuals who are less likely to be recipients of social welfare. Testing the self-interest hypothesis on a
sample of 14 transitional countries, Habibov (2012) found that
wealthier individuals, as well as younger people with high
levels of educational attainments, held negative attitudes to
government expenditures on social welfare, while those who
were less educated, women and older individuals held much
more positive attitudes to social welfare.
The ideology hypothesis could provide another important
explanation of differences in attitudes to welfare expenditures
(Jæger, 2008; Lipset, 1963). According to this hypothesis, attitudes to welfare are determined by one’s view on the proper
relationships between individuals and society (Derks, 2004;
Jæger, 2006a, 2006b). People who support economic individualism believe that each person should be responsible for his
or her own welfare through active participation in the market
economy, and as such do not support high levels of government intervention. In contrast, people who support social
equality expect basic rights for all citizens so that the full population can live according to prevailing standards, and they
also defend welfare expenditures to a much greater degree
than the previously mentioned group. Personal beliefs provide
yet another important explanation (Osgood, 1960). Previous
studies reported that a belief in the structural root of injustices
in society is associated with increased support for welfare state
expenditures (Blekesaune & Quandango, 2003; Voicu & Voicu,
2011).
Previous studies also suggest that public attitudes towards
the redistribution of income and wealth are the result of a
country’s economic and welfare conditions. Cutright (1965)
has suggested that the creation of a welfare state is a government response to the intensity of social problems. Wilensky
(1975) has argued that governments extend or curtail social
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welfare programs in response to social risks associated with
levels of poverty and inequality. High levels of poverty and
inequality can thus lead to demands for greater levels of redistribution and hence a more positive attitude toward redistribution (Dallinger, 2010; Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Voicu &
Voicu, 2011). In contrast, during times of economic prosperity
associated with growth of gross domestic product, support for
redistribution may fall, since the citizenship may feel less need
for welfare state protection (Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Voicu &
Voicu, 2011).
To overcome the above-discussed limitations, this study
simultaneously explores the effects of institutional trust and
self-interest, ideology, beliefs, and country-level economic
conditions. In this way, we are able to estimate the impact of
institutional trust vis-à-vis the above-described and well-documented explanations.
Finally, previous studies have focused primarily on developed countries. In contrast, this study examines the situations
in 24 former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
the Caucasus and Central Asia. Having such a diverse sample
of countries allows us to robustly test the effect of institutional
trust on attitudes towards social welfare in transitional countries. In addition, this is one of the first studies to examine the
under-researched regions of the Caucasus, Central Asia and the
Balkans. The transitional processes in these regions have been
associated with civil unrest, ethnic clashes, and full-scale wars,
and were set against a background of profound economic recession and political instability. The countries of these regions
experienced longer periods of economic recession, which were
more severe than those in high and middle income transitional
countries (Habibov, 2011a, b).
In the light of the above-mentioned evidence, the main objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between
individual- and country-level institutional trust and public attitude to social welfare expenditures, while controlling for selfinterest, ideology, personal beliefs, and economic and welfare
conditions in 24 transitional countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus and the Central Asia.

28			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Data and Method
Data Source
This study uses micro data from the Life-in-Transition
(LIT) survey, which was conducted by the European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank
Table 1a. Descriptive Statistics for Outcome, Individual-level of
Institutional Trust
Country

Pro-social
Welfare

Individual-level Social Capital1

Expenditure
(%)1

M

SD

Min.

Max.

Albania

72.9

27.40

8.938

10

50

Armenia

91.4

26.23

8.953

10

50

Azerbaijan

88.9

33.39

9.252

10

50

Belarus

93.4

31.60

8.285

10

50

Bosnia

82.3

25.00

10.08

10

50

Bulgaria

93.3

23.95

8.598

10

50

Estonia

90.6

31.20

6.018

10

49

FRY Macedonia

74.5

23.79

9.607

10

50

Georgia

86.2

30.13

8.145

10

50

Hungary

86.5

27.69

7.809

10

50

Kazakhstan

89.3

31.06

7.639

10

50

Kyrgyzstan

88.9

28.78

8.947

10

50

Latvia

91.9

27.83

5.900

10

49

Lithuania

96.6

26.75

6.398

10

49

Moldova

87.5

26.66

9.023

10

50

Montenegro

80.8

29.07

9.036

10

50

Poland

93.1

27.46

7.444

10

50

Romania

93.9

27.06

8.137

10

50

Russia

93.8

25.44

8.125

10

50

Serbia

81.8

24.07

8.896

10

50

Tajikistan

86.6

37.48

8.562

10

50

Turkey

91.3

31.87

10.64

10

50

Ukraine

88.4

23.25

8.295

10

50

Uzbekistan

92.4

36.59

7.892

10

50

in 2006. Since the detailed description of the LIT’s methodology, including a report on observations and a discussion of the experiences with data collection is available elsewhere (EBRD, 2007; Synovate, 2006), we will limit ourselves
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Table 1b. Descriptive Statistics for Outcome, Country-level Variables
Country

Pro-Social
Welfare

Country-level Variables

Expenditure
(%)1

Poverty Rate
(%)2

Gini (%)2,3

GDP4

Albania

72.9

24

31

6102

Armenia

91.4

50

32

4096

Azerbaijan

88.9

4

18

4496

Belarus

93.4

2

29

8541

Bosnia

82.3

4

29

6341

Bulgaria

93.3

4

33

9809

Estonia

90.6

5

33

16548

FRY Macedonia

74.5

4

37

8760

Georgia

86.2

52

39

3611

Hungary

86.5

1

24

16975

Kazakhstan

89.3

21

31

8699

Kyrgyzstan

88.9

70

28

1721

Latvia

91.9

3

35

13040

Lithuania

96.6

4

32

14197

Moldova

87.5

43

32

2362

Montenegro

80.8

6

29

8238

Poland

93.1

3

32

13784

Romania

93.9

12

28

9361

Russia

93.8

9

34

11853

Serbia

81.8

6

29

8517

Tajikistan

86.6

74

33

1500

Turkey

91.3

20

40

11465

Ukraine

88.4

1

26

5583

Uzbekistan

92.4

47

36

2001

Source: 1Synovate (2006, LITS) for share of population supporting pro-social welfare
expenditure and measures of individual level of social capital; 2Alam et al. (2005) for
poverty rate and Gini; 3Gini coefficient fluctuates between value of 0, that indicates
perfect income equality in the country, and value of 1,that indicates perfect inequality. We converted Gini coefficient to Gini index in (%) to make it more comparable
with other variables in the model; 4World Development Indicators (World Bank,
2013) for GDP per capita in international USD adjusted for Purchasing power parity
(PPP).
Note: Figures are rounded up.

to a brief discussion of the data. The objective of the LIT was to
gather directly comparable information about individuals’ and
households’ experiences and attitudes in transitional countries. The LIT covered Central Europe (including the Balkans
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and Turkey), Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia
(excluding Turkmenistan). The LIT is a cross-sectional survey,
and its questionnaire incorporates a wide range of topics
including: the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, household expenditures, and attitudes and values. In
each participating country, 1,000 individuals were selected
for face-to-face interviews with trained interviewers. Hence,
our sample consisted of approximately 24,000 respondents
in 24 countries. Because of its high levels of quality, the LIT
has already been used for international comparative studies
(Habibov, 2011a, 2012).
Outcome Variable
The outcome variable of interest is a respondent’s attitude towards prioritizing government expenditure in social
welfare. This outcome variable is measured in the LIT by
asking respondents the question “In your opinion, which of
these fields should be the first priority for extra government
investment?” A wide range of possible alternatives—from
education and pensions to public infrastructure and price
control—are provided for the respondent. For the purposes of
our study, we recoded these responses to a new binary variable. The new variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent
identified one of the major domains of social welfare such as:
old-age pension, unemployment insurance, social assistance
benefits, education, and healthcare, as the first priority for
extra government investments. This variable takes the value
of 0 if a respondent identified responses which are not in the
major domain of social welfare, such as building factories,
army, agriculture, corruption, and the like, as the first priority for extra government investments. Consequently, this variable is used to assess whether government social welfare is
viewed by the population as the priority for extra government
expenditures. The distribution of outcome variables by countries and across samples of countries under investigation is
reported in the first column of Table 1.
Independent Variables - Individual Level
Institutional trust. As suggested by the recent article by
Voicu & Voicu (2011), we measure multiple dimensions of
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institutional trust at the individual level by computing an
additive index. For the all countries included in this study,
the LITS provides information about the population’s trust in:
(1) the government; (2) the Parliament; (3) courts; (4) political
parties; (5) armed forces; (6) the police; (7) the financial system;
(8) foreign investors; (9) non-governmental organizations; and
(10) trade-unions. The response for each question is provided
in a Likert-type scale and coded as Complete distrust =1, Some
distrust = 2, Neither trust nor distrust = 3, Some trust = 4, Complete
trust = 5. The additive index is computed by adding the scales
for all ten dimensions. For instance, if a respondent answers
‘complete mistrust’ in all ten institutions, then the respondent’s index of trust is equal to 10. Conversely, if a respondent
has complete trust in all ten institutions, then the respondent’s
index of trust is equal to 50. The distribution of the index by
countries and across the sample of countries under investigation is reported in the second, third, fourth, and fifth columns
of Table 1.
Self-interest. Age, gender, education, and household expenditure level were selected, since the previous study by
Habibov (2012) reported that these variables are strong predictors of self-interest in transitional countries. For the purposes
of consistency, we used a recoding system similar to that used
in Habibov (2012). Hence, age was coded into two categories:
17-39 years and 40-59 years, otherwise = 0. Gender was coded
female = 1, otherwise = 0. Education was coded into a binary
variable based on the highest level of academic qualification
attained: bachelor level or higher = 1, otherwise = 0.
All households in each country of investigation were
ranked into 5 quintiles based on the households’ total per
capita expenditures. The first quintile represents the poorest
25 percent of the country’s population, while the fifth quintile
represents the wealthiest 25 percent of the country’s population. The direct cross-country comparison of the households’
total per capita expenditures without using quintiles would
not be valid, due to the high variation in expenditure between
countries. For instance, expenditure of poorest households
in Eastern Europe is equal to or higher than expenditure of
middle strata households in Central Asia. By contrast, using
quintiles allowed us to compare effects of the poorest 25
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percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Overall, according to the self-interest theory, we expect
that being younger, having a higher level of educational attainment, and living in a wealthier household will be associated
with negative attitudes towards government expenditures to
social welfare, while being a female will be associated with
positive attitudes.
Ideology. To gauge the effect of ideology, as suggested by
Habibov (2011a), two binomial variables, market economy and
government involvement in reducing inequality, were created.
A stated support of the market economy is expected to be associated with lower levels of support for welfare expenditures,
while government involvement in reducing inequality is expected to have an opposite effect.
Beliefs. To gauge the effects of belief, a binomial variable, structural injustice, was created. This variable indicates
whether an individual strongly believes that the main reason
that people are currently in need is the result of societal injustice rather than bad luck or individual fault. We hypothesize that belief in structural injustice could be associated with
support for social welfare expenditures.
The descriptive statistics for the above-described variables
are presented in Table 2.
Independent Variables–Country-Level
Institutional trust. Country-level institutional trust was
assessed by aggregating individual institutional trust at the
country-level (Blekesaune, 2007; Blekesaune & Quandango,
2003; Habibov & Afandi, 2011; Poortinga, 2006a, b). The procedure for aggregating individual-level institutional trust to
the country-level institutional trust detailed below. First of all,
recall that institutional trust at individual level is represented
by the additive index which varied from 10 to 50 for each individual. Hence, about 1000 respondents in each country under
investigation has an additive index with values from 10 to 50.
Next, we computed the mean of individual-level institutional
trust by country. Consequently, for each participating country,
the mean of the additive index of institutional trust was computed. Therefore, this mean represents the average level of
trust for each of the participating countries.
Economic conditions. We used Gross Domestic Product
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(GDP), since it is the most widely used indicator of economic
development employed by the studies on attitude to social
welfare (Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Voicu & Voicu, 2011). GDP
data referred to the same period of 2005 for all countries,
which means a lag by one year, as compared with the LIT data
collected in 2006. This permits us to reveal the impact (if any)
of variation in country GDP to subsequent public attitudes
towards social welfare expenditures. GDP measures for each
country were taken from the World Development Indicators
database maintained by the World Bank (2013) and reflected
country GDP per capita in international U.S. dollars adjusted
by Purchasing Power Parity.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Individual-level Independent
Variables
Variable
Age 17-39
Age 40-59
Female
University
Education
Households
Expenditure
Market
Preferable

Definition
Respondent age 17-39
= 1, otherwise = 0
Respondent age 40-59
= 1, otherwise = 0
Respondent is female =
1, otherwise = 0
Bachelor education or
higher = 1, otherwise
=0
Quintiles of total
household expenditure
per capita
Market economy preferable = 1, otherwise
=0

M

2.50

SD

Min.

Max.

Yes
(%)

No
(%)

0

1

39.4

60.6

0

1

34.6

65.3

0

1

58.5

41.5

0

1

19.3

80.7

1

4

0

1

42.5

57.4

1.12

State
Involvement

Strongly agree that the
state should be actively
involved in reducing
inequality in society =
1, otherwise = 0

0

1

69.5

30.4

Structural
Injustice

The main reason for
people in need today is
injustice in society = 1,
otherwise = 0

0

1

44.4

55.5

Source: Synovate (2006, LITS). Note: Figures are rounded up.

Welfare conditions. Poverty and inequality are used to
capture each country’s welfare conditions. Both measures
are taken from the World Bank report (Alam et al., 2005).
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The authors of the report used nationally-representative
household surveys to estimate poverty and inequality levels in
each of the participating countries. Poverty is measured by the
international poverty line of 2.15 U.S. dollars per day, adjusted
by Purchasing Poverty Parity, while inequality is measured by
the Gini coefficient. The advantage of using the statistics from
Alam et al. (2005) is that the poverty and inequality indices were
created from nationally-representative data using the same
methodology for each participating country, thus ensuring the
validity and comparability of the statistics. Another advantage
is that the indices referred to the same period of 2002-2003 for
all countries. In addition, the poverty and inequality indices
of 2002-2003 lag by 3-4 years as compared with the LIT data
collected in 2006. This allows us to uncover the effect (if any)
of variation in country-levels of poverty and inequality to subsequent public attitudes towards social welfare expenditures.
Finally, poverty and inequality reflect ultimate outcome and
raison d’être of welfare state institutions, while indicators such
as GDP per capita represent economic output only (Habibov,
2011a). Even in the country with high GDP per capita, inequality in GDP distribution would lead to higher level of poverty,
since a relatively smaller share of the resources are available
to those at the bottom of the income distribution (Dagdeviren,
Hoeven, & Weeks, 2004; Wodon & Yitzhaki, 2003).
Method
We estimate a two-level binomial logistic regression model,
modeling individual and country variations in a respondent’s
attitude towards government expenditures in social welfare.
These tests were conducted using the GLLAMM module to the
STATA 10 software package (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008).
The selected multilevel modeling strategy accounted for the
hierarchical structure of the LIT data set, which includes individuals (level 1) nested within countries (level 2). The selected
multilevel model allows for the estimation of two important
parameters: fixed and random effects. Fixed effect is defined
as the overall relationships between individual-level independent variables and outcome variable across all countries under
investigation. The random effect, in the form of correlation
coefficients rho, is defined as the variation between countries
in respondents’ attitudes towards the priority of government
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expenditures in social welfare, which cannot be accounted
for by the individual-level independent variables. The illustrations of such an unobserved variation between countries
could be cultural differences, such as customs and traditions,
historical experience, for example, ethnic conflicts and political instability, and different pace of transition, for instance,
countries which were early reformers versus countries which
were late reformers. A statistically significant rho signals that a
considerable share of total variance in attitude originates from
country-level differences. In addition, the higher the value of
rho, the higher share of the total variance in attitude originates
from community-level differences. Although the data set contains only 24 clusters (countries), the recent studies concur that
having more than 10 clusters is enough to estimate a multilevel logistic regression (Austin 2010; Habibov, 2013; Snijders
& Boskers, 1999).

Results
All together, a series of nine two-level logistic regression
models was estimated sequentially (Snelgrove, Pikhart, &
Stafford, 2009). The models report the likelihood of identifying
expenditures for social welfare as a priority for government.
Table 3 presents the results of the first four models (Models 1,
2, 3 and 4).
Model 1, the empty model with no predictors, provides
a baseline estimate of the correlation coefficient rho. In this
model, variation in the attitude is partitioned between individuals within countries and between countries. The purpose
of this model is to estimate a benchmark for the size of country-level variation in all subsequent models. The value of the
correlation coefficients rho in Model 1 indicates that 8.1% of
total variance resides at the country-level.
Country-level aggregated institutional trust is added in
Model 2. This model estimates the unadjusted contribution of
trust at the country-level to the attitude towards social welfare
expenditure. The purpose of this model is to reveal how much
variance, on the country-level, can be explained by trust.
Model 2 provides no evidence of an association between institutional trust at the country-level and the attitude towards priority of government expenditures for social welfare. However,
the model does show that 8.1% percent of total variance in the
attitude still resides at the country-level.

OR

-8405

Log likelihood

Source: Synovate (2006, LITS).
Note: Figures are rounded up.

0.081

0.000

rho

p-value for rho

0.081
-8405

0.000

0.077
-8404

0.000

0.033

0.308

-10073

0.000

0.070

1.030

Random Effect

1.034

OR

Institutional trust aggregated

0.557

0.320

p-value

1.001

0.025

0.006

SE

0.028

0.001

SE

Model 4

GDP

1.014

0.525

p-value

Inequality

0.030

SE

Model 3

0.994

1.019

OR

Model 2

Poverty

Country (level 2)

Institutional trust of respondent

Structural injustice

State involvement

Market preferable

Households expenditure

University education

Female

Age 40-59

Age 17-39

Individual (level 1)

Fixed Effect

Model 1

Table 3. Multilevel Regression for Public Support for Social Welfare Expenditure

0.239

0.060

p-value
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Model 3 expands the second model by incorporating country-level poverty and inequality. Adjusting for country-level
poverty and inequality levels did not substantially change the
overall picture. All three country-level predictors are non-significant, although the percent of total variance in the attitude
residing at the country-level slightly was reduced to 7.7%.
Adjustment for GDP in Model 4 demonstrated similar results.
In addition, we separately regressed country-level indicators,
namely poverty, inequality, and GDP on the attitude toward
social welfare expenditure. In all cases, our country-level indicators do not have statistically significant association with attitude towards social welfare expenditure. The results of these
regressions are not shown here in order to conserve space, but
are available from the authors upon request.
The results of estimations for Models 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are
reported in Table 4. In contrast with previous models, Model
5 includes only individual-level trust variables to estimate the
unadjusted contribution of respondents’ trust. Model 5 shows
that an increase in social trust at the individual level is a significant predictor of attitudes towards social welfare expenditure.
Model 6 expands the fifth model by including all the individual-level variables of the model. This model is designed to
estimate the simultaneous effect of all individual-level independent variables without taking into account country-level
variations. The results demonstrate that an increase in trust at
the individual level continues to be associated with positive
attitudes to social welfare expenditure, after adjusting for the
simultaneous effect of all individual-level independent variables. In addition to trust, all other individual-level variables
also have predicted directions. Being younger, having higher
levels of educational attainment, living in wealthier households, and showing preferences for a market economy are associated with negative attitudes towards government expenditures on social welfare. In contrast, being female and strongly
supporting the state involvement in reducing inequality in
society is associated with positive attitudes towards government expenditures on social welfare. Finally, after controlling
for the simultaneous effect of all individual-level independent
variables, approximately 7.6% of total variance in the attitude
originates in country-level differences, which is fairly similar
to the results obtained in the previous models.
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Table 4a. Multilevel Regression for Public Support for Social Welfare Expenditure
Model 5
OR

SE

Model 6
p-value

Model 7

OR

SE

p-value

OR

SE

p-value

Age 17-39

0.565

0.035

0.000

0.570

0.035

0.000

Age 40-59

0.592

0.037

0.000

0.592

0.037

0.000

Female

1.481

0.061

0.000

1.475

0.061

0.000

0.835

0.044

0.001

0.835

0.043

0.001

0.960

0.019

0.037

0.959

0.019

0.031

0.856

0.036

0.000

0.864

0.036

0.001

1.190

0.056

0.000

1.181

0.055

0.000

0.994

0.044

0.894

0.974

0.042

0.574

1.008

0.002

0.000

1.004

0.008

0.609

Fixed effect
Individual (level 1)

University
education
Households
expenditure
Market
preferable
State
involvement
Structural
injustice
Institutional
trust of
respondent

1.007

0.002

0.002

Country (level 2)
Poverty
Inequality

0.999

0.024

0.964

GDP

1.001

0.001

0.141

1.032

0.032

0.345

Institutional
trust
aggregated
Random effect
rho

0.079

0.076

0.067

p-value for
rho

0.000

0.000

0.000

Log likelihood

-8290

-8210

-8257

Source: Synovate (2006, LITS).
Note: Figures are rounded up.

Model 7 contains all of the independent variables on the individual- and country-levels, with the exception of trust at the
individual level. This model allows us to begin answering the
question of whether the contribution of country-level trust to
the attitude towards social welfare expenditures is caused by
compositional differences in the social-demographic
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characteristics of individuals versus aggregated country social
trust. As shown by Model 7, the country effects remain nonsignificant after controlling for the individual- and countrylevel differences, while the effects of social-demographic characteristics of individuals is similar to those in sixth model.
Table 4b. Multilevel Regression for Public Support for Social Welfare
Expenditure
Model 8
OR

SE

Model 9
p-value

OR

SE

p-value

0.565

0.035

0.000

Fixed effect
Individual (level 1)
Age 17-39
Age 40-59

0.591

0.036

0.000

Female

1.480

0.061

0.000

0.835

0.043

0.001

0.960

0.018

0.037

0.856

0.036

0.000

1.190

0.055

0.000

0.994

0.043

0.905

1.008

0.002

0.001

1.004

0.009

0.618

University
education
Households
expenditure
Market
preferable
State
involvement
Structural
injustice
Institutional
trust of
respondent

1.007

0.002

0.001

Country (level 2)
Poverty
Inequality

0.999

0.026

0.961

GDP

1.001

0.001

0.143

1.023

0.033

0.473

Institutional
trust
aggregated
Random effect

1.009

0.029

0.759

rho

0.079

0.068

p-value for
rho

0.000

0.000

Log likelihood

-10020

-8208

Source: Synovate (2006, LITS).
Note: Figures are rounded up.
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Model 8 only considers the contribution of trust variables,
both at the individual level and at the country level. The aim of
this model is to estimate and compare the effect of individual
and aggregated country trust. Therefore, this model can further
uncover the degree to which country-level differences in trust
can be explained by individual-level trust versus country-level
trust. By directly comparing the effects of the individual- and
country-levels in Model 8, we can confirm that country-level
differences in the attitude towards social welfare expenditure
can better be explained by individual-level trust than by the
country-level.
Finally, Model 9 contains all of the independent variables
on the individual and community levels. This model serves to
estimate whether trust has a contextual effect after controlling
for all socio-demographic and trust variables at the individual
level. After controlling for all individual-level independent
variables in Model 9, the effects of all country-level variables,
including aggregated institutional trust, continue to be nonsignificant. The effects of the individual-level independent
variables, including institutional trust, remain about the same
as in Models 6 and 7. At the same time, approximately 6.8% of
total variance in the attitude was still found to originate from
country-level differences.

Conclusion
The objective of the current study is to assess the importance of institutional trust on public attitudes towards government expenditure for social welfare in the former socialist
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and
Central Asia. Using comparable data from 24 countries, this
study employed multilevel regression modeling, which allows
for the simultaneous inclusion of variables at the individual
and country levels of analysis. The empirical analysis presented in this paper provides several interesting insights.
First, with regard to the main aim of this study, the indicator of institutional trust was considered a predictor at both
the individual and country-levels simultaneously. The findings suggest that the beneficial properties of institutional
trust are attributable to the individual level only. Individual
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level institutional trust is associated, although rather weakly,
with positive attitudes to social welfare expenditure in all estimated models. Individuals with higher levels of trust were
more likely to support social welfare as a priority for government expenditure. Therefore, the lack of institutional trust at
the individual level has translated to into strong anti-welfare
sentiment. In contrast, country-level institutional trust is not
associated with positive attitudes to social welfare according
to all the estimated models. There seems to be no evidence
that a lack of institutional trust at the country-level leads to the
erosion of support for social welfare expenditure.
At the same time, between about 7 and 8 percent of total
variance in attitude still resides at the country level. Taken
together, these results seem to support the conclusion that
institutional trust is not a key factor with regard to an understanding of differences in attitudes to social welfare expenditure between transitional countries. Rather than having
a contextual influence on attitude, the beneficial properties of
institutional trust can only be found at the individual level. It
must be highlighted that relatively low levels of cross-country
variation in the attitude to welfare institutions in transitional
countries is in line with previous findings. The recent study of
Habibov (2013) focused on multilevel analysis of factors affecting attitude to welfare state efforts to reduce inequality in 14
transitional countries of the Baltic, Central Asia, the Caucasus,
Moldova and the Slavic countries of the former Soviet Union.
The study reported significant but relatively low variance in
the attitude at the country level. Only 10(?) to 0.3 percent of
total variance in attitude to social welfare efforts to reduce
income inequality originated at the country level, depending
on the variables and regression model specification.
These findings imply that high levels of institutional trust
within a country do not automatically lead to more positive
attitudes towards redistribution. Even if a country has a large
stock of institutional trust, not all citizens will benefit from it
uniformly. Rather, the beneficial effects of institutional trust
apply mainly to more trusting individuals. As such, the benefits of institutional trust seem to be generated through an interaction between individuals and their social environment. This
finding also supports the conceptualization of institutional
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trust as a social resource. Like a natural resource, institutional
trust may primarily benefit only those individuals who are
able to access it. Individuals who are not able access it do not
seem to profit directly from the available resources.
This finding may also highlight a darker side of social
capital. Putnam (2000) noted that tightly knit societies may
be less tolerant towards certain groups of individuals based,
for instance, on their ethnicity or religious beliefs. In this way,
people belonging to these groups may be ignored or discriminated against by their fellow citizens. As a result, these individuals may experience much less support from government
actions, including welfare expenditure. The recent study by
Stern (2013) seems to support Putnam’s warning. The study
found higher levels of social capital are associated with lower
diversity, since high social capital helps to maintain racial
homogeneity through the reduction in the costs of excluding
minorities such as immigrants or non-dominant races. Higher
trust and closer social networks assist community organizing
aimed at promoting social exclusion based on racial, class, or
immigration status criteria through various formal and informal mechanisms.
The evidence of the negative effect of social capital can also
be found beyond the U.S. and other industrialized countries
in developing and transitional countries. Roßteutscher (2010)
studied a sample of 70 countries covered by the World Values
Survey worldwide. The author reported that in non-democratic countries, social capital serves to cement authoritarian
rule inasmuch as the higher level of social capital is negatively
associated with countries’ prospects for democratic development. The negative effect of social trust, as a dimension of
social capital, on democratic development is especially negative. Describing the mechanisms of negative effects of social
trust on democratization, Roßteutscher (2010) stated that:
In nondemocratic contexts, … it [social trust] appears to
throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust
increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by
generating popular support, by suppressing regimethreatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing
undemocratic ideals concerning governance. (p. 752)
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The negative effect of social capital can be particularly
strong in transitional countries (Kaminska, 2010). Considering
the role of social capital in transitional countries, the author
concludes that social capital hinders development of truly cooperative behavior, facilitates the growth in shadow economy,
and is a significant factor preventing adaption of the market
economy.
Second, this study found various significant relationships
at the individual level. Most of these relationships have a predicted direction. Being women, in the older age category, less
educated, and low-income is associated with a more positive
attitude to social welfare investments. This finding supports
the self-interest theory of attitudes to welfare investments in
transitional countries. We found that positive attitudes towards
the state’s involvement in reducing inequality are associated
with positive attitudes towards social welfare expenditure.
It seems that people in transitional countries consider social
welfare to be a primary instrument for reducing the existing
gap between poor and rich. This finding shows that ideology
is an important factor in explaining variation in public attitude
towards social welfare.
Third, while previous studies have reported significant
effects regarding economic and welfare conditions (Blekesaune,
2007; Dallinger, 2010), no effects on country-level variations
with regard to poverty, inequality, and GDP were found in this
study. This finding may suggest that, in transitional countries,
the subjective assessments that people make of their own situations may play a more important role in shaping their attitudes towards social welfare than country-level economic and
welfare indicators. Indeed, consider the examples of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, three neighboring transitional countries in the Caucasus. Oil-rich Azerbaijan has the lowest absolute poverty rate – 4%, followed by Armenia – 50% and Georgia
– 52%. Despite such a profound variation in country-wide economic indicators, the differences found in peoples’ self-assessments of their levels of welfare across the three countries was
found to be negligible. About 14% of Azerbaijanis consider
themselves very poor, which is close to 13% of Armenians and
15% of Georgians (Habibov & Afandi, 2009). Likewise, about
10% of Azerbaijanis consider themselves to be living in the
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lowest strata of society, which is close to 12% of Georgians and
17% of Armenians (Habibov, 2011b). It appears that low-income individuals in Azerbaijan still consider themselves poor,
even if they are relatively richer than Armenians or Georgians.
This evidence may imply that individuals in transitional countries choose to support social welfare by comparing themselves
with neighbors, friends, and co-workers, rather than making a
cross-country comparison with regard to their relative levels
of poverty and inequality. This conclusion is supported by the
fact that all together, only about 7 - 8% of variation in attitudes
to welfare can be explained at the country level.
An alternative explanation for the lack of the effect of country-level poverty, inequality, and GDP is that countries differ in
their social welfare policies, and specific programs. As such,
the peoples’ perceptions about the fairness and effectiveness
of these programs may also impact public attitudes towards
social welfare expenditure (Habibov & Afandi, 2011; Svallfors,
2007). Yet another possible explanation is that obtaining only
single-year data on poverty and inequality is inadequate for
revealing the true effects of country-level economic indicators.
Unfortunately, many transitional countries, especially
those in the Caucasus and Central Asia, are currently lacking
reliable longitudinal data in general and data about poverty
and inequality in particular (Habibov, 2012). Lack of longitudinal data and cross-sectional design do not allow us to establish
a cause-effect relationship between trust and attitudes to social
welfare expenditures. This constitutes one of the limitations
of this paper. Another limitation is that the data set used in
the current study was not specifically designed for the purpose
of examining institutional trust at the individual and country
levels. The same items were used to measure individual- and
country-level trust. Although it is common practice in the
field of social capital research to aggregate individual measures to higher levels of analyses (Habibov & Afandi, 2011),
we would be remiss if we automatically assumed that aggregated measures fully reflect institutional trust at the countrylevel. Using the additive index of institutional trust could also
be considered a potential limitation, although it allows us to
create a single aggregated measure of institutional trust at the
country level. Future studies could overcome this limitation by
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estimating and comparing the effect of trust to each institution on attitudes to social welfare expenditure. In spite of the
above-mentioned limitations, this study provides valuable
contributions with regard to institutional capital and attitudes
towards social welfare expenditure in the transitional countries, and suggests an agenda for future studies on this topic.
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